The Effects of Safety Practices, Technology Adoption, and Firm Characteristics on Motor Carrier Safety by Dammen, Sarah J.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
The Effects of Safety Practices, Technology Adoption, and Firm Characteristics on Motor Carrier 
Safety 
Author(s): Sarah J. Dammen 
Source: Journal of the Transportation Research Forum, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring 2005), pp. 103-120 
Published by: Transportation Research Forum 
Stable URL:  http://www.trforum.org/journal 
 
 
The Transportation Research Forum, founded in 1958, is an independent, nonprofit organization of 
transportation professionals who conduct, use, and benefit from research. Its purpose is to provide an impartial 
meeting ground for carriers, shippers, government officials, consultants, university researchers, suppliers, and 
others seeking exchange of information and ideas related to both passenger and freight transportation. More 
information on the Transportation Research Forum can be found on the Web at www.trforum.org. 
Transportation Research Forum 
 
  103
The theory of the fi rm suggests that fi rms should maximize profi t by investing in safety until marginal 
cost is equal to the marginal benefi t. This paper addresses motor carrier safety from the perspective 
of the fi rm, developing the theoretical framework for fi rm safety decisions. Additionally, this paper 
tests the relationship between fi rm safety performance and safety practices, new safety technologies, 
and fi rm marketing strategies. By testing the impact of the safety performance marketing strategy on 
carrier accident rates, it can be shown that fi rm managers have control over the safety performance 
of their fi rms through management decisions.
by Sarah J. Dammen 
The Effects of Safety Practices, Technology 
Adoption, and Firm Characteristics on Motor 
Carrier Safety
Safety in the motor carrier industry has been 
a topic of public concern dating to the infancy 
of the industry. Since that time, the U.S. motor 
carrier industry has undergone many structural, 
technical, and regulatory changes. Government 
safety regulations, safety-related technologies, 
and firm safety practices have evolved, 
producing a general trend of improved safety 
in transportation industries (McCarthy, 2001, 
pp. 564-566).
Economic deregulation of the motor carrier 
industry gave rise to a wealth of economic 
literature focusing on the safety effects of 
deregulation. Within this literature, areas of 
concern include the effect of new entrants, the 
effect of declining profi tability due to increased 
competition (the profi t-safety relationship), and 
mode shifting. Research since deregulation 
has focused on the physical conditions in the 
causation of accidents, driver characteristics, and 
government safety regulations. Research focused 
on carrier management policies and fi rm safety 
behavior, an exception being Corsi and Fanara 
(1988) has been less common.
How do fi rms make safety-related decisions? 
The theory of the fi rm suggests that fi rms should 
invest in safety practices and technologies until 
marginal cost is equal to the marginal benefi t of 
the reduction in the carrier accident rate. The 
theoretical framework of this paper proposes 
that in the face of uncertainty regarding the 
occurrence of vehicle accidents, fi rms maximize 
expected profi t by choosing an optimal output 
level and an optimal mix of safety inputs.
This paper adds to the economic literature 
on motor carrier safety addressing motor carrier 
safety from the fi rm perspective. In a fashion 
similar to Corsi and Fanara (1988), it is the 
underlying premise of this paper that firms 
have a direct impact on their accident rate. 
Firm managers influence their accident rate 
through safety practices and safety technology 
adoption, given their fi rm characteristics. Firm 
management policies and marketing strategies 
demonstrate that fi rm managers can target and 
successfully impact their carrier’s accident rate. 
Government safety regulations alone may not 
be the most effective means for reducing truck-
related crashes. This paper advocates focusing 
on the behavior of the fi rm and fi rm incentives 
to adopt new safety technology for increasing 
motor carrier industry safety. With the increasing 
industry and government focus on motor carrier 
safety and security, it is necessary to add 
research on the topic and to evaluate the impact 
of technology, fi rm practices and government 
regulations on industry safety.
The empirical section of this paper tests the 
effects of safety practices, technologies, and fi rm 
characteristics on the carrier injury and fatality 
accident rates. Safety practices include safety 
meetings, fi rm speed limit, motorist “call-in” 
number, and apprenticeship training programs. 
Firm characteristics tested in this paper are: 
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fi rm size, less-than-truckload (LTL) carriers, 
use of owner-operators, unionization, the fi rm 
marketing strategies, on-time performance, and 
safety performance.
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE
Lave (1968) focused on the role of government in 
providing transportation safety. Asserting, “We 
can be too safe,” he goes on to make the case that 
safety is a scarce resource (p. 512). This article 
is noteworthy for a discussion on transportation 
safety because it is one of the fi rst articles on 
the subject and it clearly identifi es transportation 
safety as an economic good; there are tradeoffs 
required to achieve higher levels of safety.
Lave indirectly questions whether there 
was too much safety provided in the regulated 
transportation industries, because train, bus, and 
air passenger-fatality rates were all signifi cantly 
lower than private automobile passenger-fatality 
rates. If regulated freight rates were above the 
competitive levels that would have existed in 
a non-regulated industry, economic regulation 
may have induced safety spending above the 
level fi rms would have chosen in a competitive 
environment. Specifi cally, rate-of-return regula-
tion likely resulted in over-investment in capital 
(Traynor & McCarthy, 1991).
Although academic research as early 
as the 1950s demonstrated that regulation 
created inefficiencies and significant rents 
to transportation industries, it was not until 
1980 that deregulatory legislation became 
law. President John F. Kennedy supported 
deregulation in 1962, however the movement 
toward deregulation faced strong opposition by 
the Teamsters and industry groups such as the 
American Trucking Association (ATA), stalling 
deregulation efforts until the late 1970s. Greater 
social acceptance of market forces provided the 
support needed to begin the gradual process 
of market deregulation. The first movement 
toward deregulation occurred in 1975 when 
the ICC modified rules to promote more 
competition in the trucking industry. By 1979, 
the ICC had eliminated rules that prevented 
competition between contract and common 
carriers. Following this move, the ICC proposed 
“relaxing entry standards and freeing rates for a 
signifi cant portion of the trade” (Moore, 2002, 
p. 7). The Motor Carrier Regulatory Reform and 
Modernization Act of 1980 (MCA) signifi cantly 
deregulated the motor carrier industry, however 
complete deregulation of the industry did not 
occur until the mid 1990s when the ICC 
was abolished. As a result of the MCA, real 
rates for shippers decreased, many new fi rms 
entered the trucking industry, and there was a 
dramatic decrease in industry profi t. Perhaps 
the most controversial public issue concerning 
deregulation of the motor carrier industry and the 
passage of the MCA were the safety effects of the 
impending deregulation (Moore, 2002).
Along with the passage of the MCA came 
an explosion of deregulation literature, including 
safety-deregulation literature. Prominent topics 
in the deregulation-safety literature include 
the effect of new entrants and the profi t-safety 
relationship. The new-entrants literature focused 
on the increased entry of small new fi rms and 
the occurrence of “fly-by-night” fi rms. New 
fi rms with inexperienced managers, young and 
inexperienced drivers, along with the lack of 
fi nancial backing were thought to pose the most 
serious threats for decreased industry safety. The 
profi t-safety relationship literature focuses on the 
safety effects because of declining profi ts. It was 
believed that increased competition would cause 
fi rms to “cut corners” particularly with regard to 
maintenance and safety expenditures.
The preeminent source for deregulation-
safety articles and a complete bibliography is 
the book, Transportation Safety in an Age of 
Deregulation, edited by Moses and Savage (1989). 
Papers in this book are from a deregulation and 
safety conference at the Transportation Center 
of Northwestern University. Examples include 
Adams (1989), Boyer (1989), and Hauer (1989). 
Both sides of the deregulation-safety issue are 
presented, along with chapters discussing the 
theoretical underpinnings of safety-deregulation 
arguments. This book covers both the airline and 
motor carrier industry, and addresses the profi t-
safety relationship, new entrants, congestion, as 
well as mode shifting.
Profi t-safety literature is strongly connected 
to the literature on the safety effects of industry 
deregulation, circa the late 1970s and 1980. 
One of the more signifi cant and recent papers 
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concerning the profit-safety relationship in 
the trucking industry is Beard (1992). Beard 
fi nds evidence that supports the profi t-safety 
relationship; more-profi table carriers are safer. 
Beard criticizes previous research attempts for 
data problems and use of wrong measures for 
safety and fi nancial condition. He uses roadside 
safety inspection data as a proxy for fi rm safety. 
Beard uses a cash-flow method to evaluate risky 
fi rms and probit model to test the profi t-safety 
relationship (with the dependent being the 
probability a vehicle is taken out of service 
upon inspection). Mixon and Upadhyaya (1996) 
provide a note on Beard’s 1992 paper. Using the 
same data and a two-stage least squares approach, 
they test the relationship between carrier accident 
rates and asset specifi city and fi rm size.
Corsi and Fanara (1989) is a key study on the 
safety effects of new entrants.  Examining new 
entrants versus established carriers in the years 
1980-1984, their study fi nds that new entrants 
have accident rates between 27% and 33% higher 
than the average accident rate for the established 
carriers. For the “‘newest’ of the new entrants,” 
the accident rate is nearly 70% higher than the 
average established carrier (p. 255). The safety 
effect of new entrants following deregulation 
may have been masked in aggregate studies 
because of the relatively small size of new fi rms 
and increasing safety from technology and safety 
regulations. Thus, in addition to new entrants, 
deregulation had a fi rm size effect.
Overall, the literature remains mixed as 
to the impact of deregulation on motor carrier 
safety. Traynor and McCarthy (1991, 1993), 
using aggregate California highway accident 
data, found that highway safety is independent 
of the economic environment and safety actually 
improved in the years following deregulation. 
Alexander (1992) fi nds that fatality and injury 
rates are lower, but the collective accident rate 
was unaffected by deregulation. Alexander 
goes on to recommend that safety expenditures 
at the fi rm level should be examined to see the 
change in safety inputs after deregulation, but 
he also notes there is a lack of data. Corsi et al 
(1988) fi nds “no signifi cant increase” in accident 
rates during transition years, but does fi nd that 
“certain management policies and practices do 
have a statistically signifi cant impact on carrier 
accident rate.” Among the management policies 
that should be monitored are increased use of 
owner-operators, equipment age and changes in 
carrier insurance premiums.
Evidence supporting the negative safety 
effects of deregulation is found in the analysis 
by Daicoff (1988), who fi nds that safety was 
improving prior to deregulation, and safety 
continued to improve after deregulation but 
at a slower rate. Chow (1989) finds little 
evidence between financial condition and 
safety-related activities, but notes, “as fi nancial 
fitness improved, equipment was replaced 
[more often] and less use was made of owner-
operators” (p. 239). Using this evidence to 
conclude deregulation had a negative impact 
on safety assumes that use of owner-operators 
is negatively related to carrier safety and that 
equipment age is a signifi cant factor in accidents. 
The strongest evidence of the negative safety 
effects due to deregulation is the effect of new 
entrants, who had dramatically higher accident 
rates in the fi rst few years after the passage of 
the MCA compared to the established carriers 
(Corsi & Fanara, 1989).
With no clear consensus on the safety 
effects of deregulation, one may cautiously 
conclude that deregulation had very little to no 
effect on safety. The mixture of results in the 
literature is primarily due to the poor quality 
accident data and the gradual time span over 
which deregulation occurred. In addition there 
were “signifi cant changes in vehicle technology 
and important safety regulation changes in the 
early years following the MCA 1980” that likely 
impacted safety performance of the industry 
(Moses & Savage, 1989, p. 218).
The economic literature on motor carrier 
safety since the height of the deregulation 
research is increasingly focused on factors 
related to crashes and government safety 
regulations. The literature on crash-related 
factors can be further divided into physical factors 
(environment, road type, vehicle type, etc.), fi rm-
related characteristics, and driver characteristics. 
There are numerous government, industry, and 
engineering studies examining the physical and 
mechanical aspects of truck crashes, whereas the 
economics literature focuses on fi rm and driver 
characteristics. The economics literature also 
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addresses driver and carrier compliance with 
government regulations and the effectiveness 
of government safety programs.
Monaco and Williams (2000) focus on 
the relationship between safety performance 
and carrier and driver characteristics. Using 
driver survey data, the analysis focuses on three 
dependent variables, occurrence of an accident, 
moving violation, and logbook violation. 
Occupational characteristics are found to be 
more significant than driver demographic 
characteristics. Kaneko and Jovanis (1992) fi nd 
that the patterns of driving during multi-day 
hauls can signifi cantly increase the accident risk 
during the eighth day. Additionally, the number 
of consecutive hours of driving is associated with 
higher accident risk.
Corsi, Fanara, and Roberts (1984) examine 
the relationship between carrier accident rates 
and compliance with various safety regulations. 
Interestingly, they fi nd that non-compliance with 
hours-of-service regulation is negatively related 
to carrier accident rates, while non-compliance 
with other safety regulations are all positively 
related to carrier accident rates. Both fi rm size 
and use of owner-operators are negatively related 
to accident rates. The hours-of-service regulation 
has received considerable attention in the 
literature and continues to be an area of interest 
due to the 2003 hours-of-service rule change. 
Some articles examining the role of hours-of-
service and safety are: Saltzman and Belzer 
(2002), and Williams and Monaco (2001).
Moses and Savage (1994) also fi nd that 
carrier safety performance is correlated with 
compliance with hours-of-service regulations. 
Additional fi ndings show reduced crash risk 
related to fi rm size, and fi rms that are private 
carriers (not for-hire). Contrary to the authors’ 
previous research (Moses and Savage 1992), 
older fi rms do not necessarily have higher crash 
rates; fi rm age does not appear to be related to 
crash rates.
Corsi and Fanara (1988) advocate a 
management perspective in addressing firm 
safety. They argue that managers “have a 
direct impact on their accident rate” (p. 154). 
Driver management policies which result in 
driver turnover rates are of particular interest 
and the authors fi nd that driver turnover rates 
signifi cantly increase carrier crash rates. Mejza 
et al. (2003) examine management policies and 
safety performance, specifi cally looking at hiring 
practices, driver training, driving rewards, and 
driver compliance with safety regulations. 
“The findings imply that the safest 
trucking fi rms apply screening criteria 
consistently in all driver-hiring 
situations; emphasize pre-service and 
in-service training for company drivers 
and owner-operators alike; cover a 
broad scope of topics in several venues 
during the training programs and use 
several methods to evaluate drivers in 
those programs; and use an array of 
different types of rewards to support 
drivers who demonstrate safe driving 
performance” (p. 16). 
THEORY
This paper approaches the topic of motor carrier 
safety from the fi rm perspective. It is therefore 
appropriate that the theory of the fi rm be used as 
the general theoretical framework. Following the 
theory of the fi rm is discussion of the theory of 
the relationship between motor carrier crash rates 
and safety inputs and fi rm characteristics.
Motor carrier safety starts with the fi rm. 
While government safety regulations attempt to 
ensure a minimum level of highway safety—in 
the form of highway laws and enforcement, 
provision of infrastructure and motor carrier 
safety inspections—ultimately, most trucking 
safety investment decisions are made at the fi rm 
level. Government safety regulations attempt to 
discourage or promote certain fi rm behavior. 
Following the basic tenants of the theory of 
the fi rm, fi rms act to maximize profi t and will 
invest in safety inputs until the marginal cost 
of an additional unit of a safety input is equal 
to the marginal benefi t. Maintenance activities, 
vehicle-based safety technologies, and driver 
training programs are all examples of firm 
investments that may increase their fi rm safety 
record.
Uncertainty—in many forms—plagues the 
decisions made by economic agents. Thus, a fi rm 
must take into account sources of uncertainty 
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and proceed in making input and quantity-output 
decisions by maximizing expected profi t. In 
the motor carrier industry, one major source 
of uncertainty is the occurrence of highway 
crashes. Though fi rms will engage in many safety 
practices and make safety investments to reduce 
their fi rm crash rate, some crashes will be outside 
the control of fi rms and their drivers.
Assuming the motor carrier industry is 
perfectly competitive, the fi rm is a price-taker. 
It is further assumed that safety performance of 
the fi rm has no noticeable effect on price. Price 
may be a function of fi rm characteristics, such as 
the type of commodity hauled, and whether the 
carrier is a less-than-truckload (LTL) or truckload 
(TL) carrier. The fi rm maximizes expected profi t 
by choosing the level of non-safety inputs, x, and 
the amount of safety inputs, s. Output q(x), is a 
function of non-safety inputs. While fi rms face 
numerous sources of uncertainty, the model will 
explicitly consider the probability of having an 
accident, (1-G(s; γ)), per unit of output.
The firm’s expected profit (Z) contains 
the vector of fi rm characteristics, (γ) and the 
cost function depends upon the level of inputs 
(non-safety and safety related), and the price of 
inputs, w, given the fi rm characteristics. Dam-
age expenses resulting from an accident are 
described by the function, D(γ), which depends 
upon a fi rm’s characteristics. The fi rm should 
maximize the following expected profi ts (Z) 
objective function:
Note that   is the random, critical variable and 
s is the known fi rm choice vector of safety in-
puts. G is a continuous, differentiable probability 
distribution function for the random variable   
where  represents a critical value of safety in-
puts, above which no accident occurs. (1-G(s;γ)) 
is then the probability that an accident occurs,
P(             .  Thus as investment in safety inputs, 
s, increases, the  probability P( f a l l s . 
Optimal output occurs at the level where the 
price is equal to the marginal cost of production, 
where marginal cost includes all the expected 
marginal costs of an accident.
Optimal safety investment, s*, occurs when 
the marginal cost of safety inputs is equal to the 
expected benefi t of the safety inputs. Benefi ts 
in this model are gained from decreasing the 
probability of an accident (and thus lower costs 
from accidents). The safety performance of the 
fi rm, measured by the number of accidents, is 
the value of (1- G(s*;γ))*q.
Like the model put forth by Golbe (1986) for 
the airline industry, this theoretical framework 
does not suggest a relationship between the 
level of expected profi t and safety performance. 
Financial condition of the fi rm could influence 
the safety performance of the fi rm in this model, 
if the fi nancial standing of the fi rm is contained 
in the vector of fi rm characteristics.
While data limitations prevent explicit testing 
of the fi rm’s safety input choices under expected 
profi t maximization, the empirical section will 
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test the relationship between safety performance 
and safety inputs. Safety performance in this 
model will be the fi rm accident rate, A, defi ned 
as a function of the fi rm’s safety inputs, s, given 
the fi rm’s characteristics, γ.
(2)
Safety inputs are any safety-enhancing policy, 
practice, or technology. The safety practices 
used by fi rm managers should decrease their 
fi rm’s crash rate. It is not clear if some of the 
safety practices are adopted retroactively. If so, 
fi rms with high accident rates may adopt safety 
practices with the hope that future accident rates 
will be lower.
Some safety practices may be more effec-
tive in reducing fi rm accident rates. For example, 
many accidents are caused by a combination of 
factors, with speed as a common component. 
Implementing a fleet speed limit would logically 
seem to have the ability to reduce fi rm accident 
rates. Specifi cally, a fleet speed limit should 
reduce crashes caused by speeding on the part 
of the truck. A fleet speed limit will not neces-
sarily help to reduce all speed-related crashes, 
as other motorists may speed and the variation 
in the speed of traffi c is a contributing factor 
to crashes. The impact of the safety practices 
is likely to vary by the quality of the particular 
practice. 
Firm characteristics are common in motor 
carrier safety literature. Some fi rm characteristics 
seem to have strong theoretical reasons to sug-
gest relationships with safety performance. Six 
fi rm characteristics will be tested in the empirical 
section. Each of these six variables will be intro-
duced with a theoretical discussion to suggest a 
relationship between each fi rm characteristic and 
safety, along with the expected sign of the rela-
tionship, and any previous empirical results.
Firm size has consistently been inversely 
related to motor carrier crash rates (Corsi et al. 
1984, Moses and Savage 1994). This has been 
explained by arguments that larger fi rms have an 
advantage with regard to fleet maintenance and 
training programs. They also have the fi nancial 
means to invest in new technologies and often 
have large safety divisions to carry out fi rm 
safety policies and monitoring. Smaller fi rms 
may have diffi culty in obtaining safety related 
information and limited capital resources to 
invest in safety technology.
Owner-operators are drivers that own their 
tractor and contract their services out to larger 
fi rms. Following principal-agent theory, owner-
operators are likely to have lower crash rates 
because the drivers will ensure their safety and 
the continued operation of their tractor through 
careful driving and thorough knowledge of their 
vehicle operation and maintenance history. The 
principal-agent theory is tested by Mixon and 
Upadhyaya (1996). However, their paper looks 
at the ownership structure of the firm, not 
ownership of tractors or trucks by the drivers. 
Contrary to principal-agent theory, which 
suggests that owner-operators have safety-
inducing incentives, Chow (1989) cites lower 
compensation for similar routes, and an inability 
to acquire resources needed for maintenance as 
reasons why owner-operators may have higher 
accident rates. In a highly competitive industry, 
owner-operators face conflicting pressure to 
ensure their own safety and their investment 
in their capital, while at the same time driving 
as many hours as possible under demanding 
schedules and avoiding additional expenditures 
on safety investments.
There have been no defi nitive results on the 
effect of unionization on fi rm safety performance. 
At the time of deregulation, the motor carrier 
industry was heavily unionized. New entrants and 
the need to cut labor costs after deregulation led 
to a decrease in the unionization of the industry. 
Given unions’ goals of promoting worker safety 
and compensation, unions likely demand higher 
safety levels, reasonable route scheduling, and 
higher wages, all of which should reduce carrier 
crash rates. Monaco and Williams (2001) test 
union membership in their probit model, but only 
fi nd a signifi cantly negative relationship between 
union membership and moving violations; and 
they fi nd the relationship between unions and 
accidents is insignifi cantly positive.
Trucking operations can be divided into 
the for-hire and private sectors. Within the 
for-hire industry there are two major segments: 
specialized carriers and general freight carriers. 
General freight carriers can be either truckload 
(TL) or less-than-truckload (LTL). Truckload 
carriers handle large shipments transported 
from one shipper to a single destination. 
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Less-than-truckload operations often involve 
hub-and-spoke operations with many small 
shipments taken to terminals and distributed to 
many locations. The growth of the LTL segment 
has been fueled by technological advancements 
and the shift toward just-in-time (JIT) inventory 
systems. Specialized carriers often are required 
to have specialized equipment for hauling such 
commodities as petroleum, wood products, and 
hazardous materials. Specialized carriers tend to 
engage in truckload (TL) operations (McMullen, 
2000, p. 142).
Chow (1989) contends that TL carriers 
“expose drivers to potentially longer and more 
irregular hours” (p. 225) because of the irregular 
turnaround and line-haul operations. Chow does 
not explicitly test LTL/TL carriers because his 
defi nition of type of carrier is based only on 
percentage of operations in intercity general 
commodity freight. Corsi and Fanara (1988, 
1989) test general freight carriers versus carriers 
of other commodities and fi nd that general freight 
carriers have higher crash rates. With relatively 
little previous research, the relationship between 
LTL carriers and fi rm accident rate is not clear. 
If one believes that LTL operations allow for 
more regular schedules and familiar routes, 
then LTL operations may reduce fi rm accident 
rates. However, LTL operations are often time-
sensitive, with time performance a top priority, 
which may lead LTL operations to increase 
fi rm accident rates, with the added diffi culty of 
intercity operations contending with congested 
city streets and highways. 
This paper will test the relationship between 
fi rm marketing strategy and fi rm accident rate. 
Two marketing strategies are included in the 
empirical section, on-time-performance (OTP) 
and safety performance (SAFESTRAT). In 
the fiercely competitive environment since 
deregulation, marketing strategies have 
developed within the motor carrier industry. Most 
commonly cited are the contrasting marketing 
strategies of on-time performance (OTP) and 
lowest-freight rate (LFR). An OTP marketing 
strategy will generally inflate operating costs 
because loads may not be full. The emergence 
of the OTP marketing strategy is the result of 
just-in-time inventory systems, consumer and 
shipper preference for fast deliveries, and is 
common for carriers of perishable or high-valued 
commodities. There is no clear expectation as to 
the relationship between either OTP and LFR 
and the fi rm accident rate, however both seem to 
have aspects that would tend to be related with 
higher accident rates. OTP requires demanding 
driver schedules, perhaps violating hours-of-
service requirements and creating an incentive 
to speed. 
Firms with a safety-performance marketing 
strategy are likely to engage in safety enhancing 
activities in order to market their safety 
performance. Firms may provide shippers with 
information to demonstrate the high degree of 
safety investment and safety performance of the 
fi rm. For these reasons it is expected that there 
is a negative relationship between SAFESTRAT 
and carrier accident rate. Embodied within the 
SAFESTRAT variable is the underlying theory 
that fi rm management decisions have a direct 
impact on their accident rate. Firms have the 
control to improve their safety performance if 
so desired.
In approaching motor carrier safety from the 
perspective of the fi rm it is important to consider 
the fi rm choice variables, safety inputs, as well as 
the variables that economic theory and previous 
research deem to be signifi cant. This section 
introduced the theoretical framework underlying 
the testing of safety practices, technology, and 
fi rm characteristics.
DATA AND MODEL
This study uses fi rm-level data for Class I and 
Class II motor carriers in 1996. Data used in 
this study was obtained from the Motor Carrier 
Safety, Operations and Technology (MSCOT) 
survey (US DOT 1999). The data set contains 
information on fi rm operating characteristics, 
safety practice and technology use, and carrier 
safety performance. While it is likely that more 
recent technology-use data have been collected, 
the use of the 1996 data provides estimates of the 
impact of safety measures in the 1990s and the 
safety effect of technologies by early adopters 
of the technologies and practices. Summary 
statistics for all variables estimated in the study 
are in Table 1.
Four of the fi rm characteristics variables 
are obtained from the annually reported motor 
carrier fi nancial and operating statistics. Use of 
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owner-operators (OOP) is created as the ratio of 
miles rented with driver to total highway miles. 
The UNION dummy variable is created as a ratio 
of health and welfare expenditures to total fringe 
expenditures. If this ratio is greater than 0.1 then 
UNION equals one, otherwise UNION is zero 
(Kerkvliet & McMullen, 1997).  Firm total 
assets, (reported in millions of dollars) is used as 
a proxy for fi rm size (SIZE). Carrier commodity 
type is used to identify those fi rms that are less-
than-truckload (LTL) carriers. The number of 
injury accidents and the number of fatal accidents 
are used to construct the dependent variables of 
the regressions. 
The ATA, together with the National 
Private Truck Council, collected fi rm safety 
practice, technology, and marketing strategy 
data in the “Motor Carrier Safety, Operations 
and Technology Survey” (MCSOTS). This 
survey included questions on the use of 
selected information technology, including 
some safety related technology and the use 
of fi rm safety practices. Due to low adoption 
rates of technologies in 1996 and the fact 
that most of the technologies in the survey 
were information technologies, only three 
safety-related technologies are included in the 
empirical analysis: collision avoidance systems 
(COLLAV), automated vehicle diagnostics 
(DIAGN), and on-board computer monitoring 
(OBCMON). The safety practices used in this 
paper are: fi rm safety meetings (SAFEMEET), 
fleet speed limit (FLEETSPEED), and use of an 
apprenticeship-training program (APRENT).
On-board computers (OBC) record 
vehicle operation statistics through sensors 
and can present the information to drivers or 
management and dispatch in real-time or on a 
trip-by-trip basis. OBC information can be used 
to analyze vehicle performance, particularly 
fuel consumption, as well as speed, erratic 
maneuvering, and hard stops. While some 
OBCs are not designed specifi cally for safety 
monitoring (fuel consumption for example) the 
MSCOT survey specifi cally asked about the 
use of OBC for safety monitoring. Collision 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
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avoidance systems (COLLAV) can also be 
used for monitoring driver performance. 
Through closed-circuit television, infrared 
or low frequency radar, COLLAV informs 
drivers of proximity to obstacles. Automated 
vehicle diagnostics systems (DIAGN) are yet 
another in-vehicle technology that can enhance 
safety through monitoring vehicle operation 
performance and maintenance activities. 
Diagnostic and maintenance support systems 
can assess vehicle performance and assists 
in creating optimal maintenance schedules 
(USDOT, 1999, pp. 4-11).
Safety practices, as mentioned in the theory 
section are generally initiated and implemented 
by the fi rm. There are a variety of fi rm safety 
practices for managers to choose from. The 
safety practice variables are all dummy variables 
indicating whether the fi rm uses a particular 
strategy. The data on safety practices, technology 
use, and marketing strategies is unique, but has 
limitations. For each of the safety practices a 
fi rm uses, there is no additional data to measure 
quality of the activities of the practices. For 
example, there is no stated speed limit for fi rms 
with fleet speed limits and there is no information 
on the frequency or length of safety meetings.
The MSCOT survey is also the source of 
the marketing strategy data. Firms were asked 
to rank fi ve marketing strategies: lowest freight 
rate, on-time-performance, short turn around, 
use of specialized and dedicated equipment, 
and safety performance. Though there were 
fi ve options, most carriers can likely be classifi ed 
as either LFR or OTP. It would be nice to test 
the dichotomous nature of the LFR and OTP 
marketing strategy, however the survey method 
of ranking strategies does not lend itself easily 
to testing LFR versus OTP firms. In fact, 
many fi rms rank OTP and LFR as their fi rst 
and second marketing strategies, though each 
strategy clearly requires a different operating 
approach. Firms with the safety performance 
marketing strategy (SAFESTRAT) are included 
in the model. Firms with a marketing strategy of 
SAFESTRAT cannot have an OTP marketing 
strategy because the fi rm could only rank one 
strategy as their top priority.
The SAFER system collects and 
disseminates safety data on interstate firms. 
The SAFER system is one way the Federal 
Motor Carrier Safety Administration hopes to 
use information technology to increase effi ciency 
and safety of motor carrier operations. Currently 
the SAFER system provides carrier profi les for 
public information. This allows shippers and 
the general public access to information on a 
specifi c carrier’s accident and inspection history 
for the previous 12-month period. SAFER data 
is also available in an annual catalog form for 
data analysis purposes. The 1996 SAFER data 
used in this study includes number and type 
of inspections (vehicle, driver, or hazardous), 
number of out of services, number of accidents 
(fatal, injury, and hazardous) and the fi rm’s 
safety rating issued by the FMCSA. This study 
uses the number of reported fatal, FA, and injury 
accidents, IA, by fi rm as reported in the SAFER 
system.
The use of accident rates in the safety 
literature has often been criticized primarily 
because of the lack of reliable truck crash data. 
The reliability of accident data has been suspect 
in the past due to fi rm reporting of the data, and 
inconsistent reporting standards across states. 
Even with accurate crash data, some critics argue 
that accident rates are inappropriate measures of 
fi rm safety because crashes involve many factors 
that are outside of the control of the fi rm. Beard 
(1992) cites these reasons in his decision to 
use inspection rates as proxy for fi rm safety 
performance. If safety inspections are closely 
correlated with accident rates then this may be 
a good measure. However, inspection rates are 
not perfectly correlated with accidents. With 
stricter reporting standards and the creation of 
the SAFER system, carrier accident data is now 
much more accurate than it was in the early 
1980s. Particularly reliable are data on fatal and 
injury accidents.
The Fatal Accident Reporting System 
(FARS) provides detailed information about 
fatal motor vehicle accidents. FARS is a highly 
detailed database of fatal motor vehicle crashes 
in the United States and has been an excellent 
source of crash causation and environmental 
factors for fatality crashes. Crash reporting 
problems of the past are improving with federal 
reporting standards, FARS, and the SAFER 
system. The creation of the SAFER system has 
drastically improved access and the accuracy of 
motor carrier crash statistics.
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The first empirical model tests the 
relationship between the fi rm injury accident (IA) 
rate and fi rm characteristics, safety practices, and 
use of safety technology. The IA model is:
(3) Ln(IARATE)= COLLAV+DIAGN+
OBCMON+SAFEMEET+FLEETSPEED
+APRENT+OTP+SAFESTRAT+LTL+
UNION+OOP+SIZE+e
The second model is identical to the fi rst except 
that it uses the fatal and injury accident rate 
(FAIA) as the dependent variable.
As discussed in the theory section, the 
expected signs of the safety practices and tech-
nology dummy variables should be negative. 
Firm characteristics may have either a positive 
or negative relationship with the fi rm accident 
rate.
Following the motor carrier accident rate 
models of Corsi and Fanara (1988, 1989) and 
Corsi et al. (1984), a semilogarithmic functional 
form has been chosen for the model. There is no 
economic theory to suggest a functional form 
and as these previous papers point out, carrier 
accident rates are distributed approximately log 
normal. Use of a semi-log functional form is 
preferred to the log-log form due to the pres-
ence of the variable owner-operator, which is 
expressed as a ratio. A logarithmic transforma-
tion is performed on the dependent variable for 
the semilogarithmic form. Many carriers had 
zero injury or fatality accidents reported, thus 
to perform the logarithmic transformation, a one 
was added to the number of carrier accidents, 
then divided by carrier miles to calculate the 
two different carrier accident rates. Corsi adds 
one to the accident rate before the logarithmic 
transformation and notes the possible bias that 
may result. A mathematical transformation of the 
coeffi cients of the dummy variables will correct 
for most of this bias, and as Corsi and Fanara 
(1984) point out, given the large sample size, 
consistency of the estimates is assured. Adding 
a one to the number of carrier accidents before 
dividing by carrier miles to create the accident 
rate likely creates less of a bias than the method 
of Corsi and Fanara (1988).
A convenient result of using the semiloga-
rithmic functional form is the interpretation of 
the impact of the various safety practices and 
fi rm characteristics. The coeffi cients of continu-
ous variables can be multiplied by 100 and then 
interpreted as the percentage effect of that vari-
able on the dependent variable. A mathematical 
transformation must be performed to interpret 
the coeffi cients of the dummy variables as per-
centage changes. 
Kennedy’s (1981) approximate unbiased 
estimator of the percentage change ( ) is 
used to convert the coeffi cients of the dummy 
variables to percentage change. To transform the 
coeffi cient into the percentage effect, the OLS 
estimate of the coeffi cient of a dummy variable, 
, and the OLS estimate of its variance, 
are used in the following equation:
(4)
A recent addition to the literature on the 
correct interpretation of dummy variables in 
semilogarithmic equations is an approximation 
for an unbiased estimator of variance (Garderen 
& Shah 2002, p. 152). Though t-statistics 
correctly determine the signifi cance of dummy 
variables in the model, the approximation for 
an unbiased estimator for the variance is a nice 
complement for Kennedy’s estimator. The 
estimator for unbiased variance is practical 
and straightforward to use, and again is a 
simple transformation using the OLS estimated 
coeffi cient and variance. The equation for the 
approximate unbiased variance estimator is:
(5)
These equations are used to calculate the 
Kennedy approximate percentage change and 
the approximate unbiased variance estimator, 
which are presented in Table 5. As Garderen 
and Shah (2002) comment, these approximations 
are “very simple, yet highly reliable,” given the 
assumption of normal disturbances.
While this model tests many fi rm safety 
practices and new safety technologies, as 
well as several firm characteristics, there 
are most likely a multitude of other factors 
that contribute toward carrier accident rates. 
Omission of relevant variables may bias the 
estimated coeffi cients. Data is unavailable for 
some relevant variables, and it is not clear what 
other variables should be included in the model. 
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As Corsi et. al. (1984) notes, “As long as omitted 
variables are not correlated with the variables 
included in our models, omitted variables 
should not have a substantial influence on the 
results presented” (p. 162). The possibility of 
omitted relevant variables seems to be a common 
problem in regressions involving accident rates 
due to the variety of factors that contribute to the 
causation of vehicle accidents.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The results of the injury accident rate (IA) model 
estimation are shown in Table 2, and the fatality/
injury (FAIA) regression results are shown in 
Table 3. In general, the results support the 
theoretical framework of the paper; fi rms choose 
safety practices and technology to decrease the 
carrier accident rate. Four of the 12 variables are 
found to be signifi cant at the 0.01 confi dence level 
in the IA model; FLEETSPEED, SAFESTRAT, 
OOP, and UNION. Variables signifi cant at the 
0.05 level are: COLLAV and SAFEMEET. All 
of the coeffi cients, except for SAFEMEET, have 
the expected (negative) signs.
Comparing the results of the two regressions, 
COLLAV is signifi cant in the IA regression 
at the 0.05 level, however COLLAV is not 
signifi cant in the FAIA model. The opposite is 
true for APRENT. APRENT is signifi cant (at 
the 0.05 level) in the FAIA regression and not 
signifi cant in the IA regression. 
The significantly positive relationship 
between SAFEMEET and carrier accident rate 
is inconsistent with theory and prediction. Ex 
post, an explanation for this result may be that 
fi rm safety meetings are an Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) work rule. 
Thus, it is possible that many fi rms implement 
safety meetings to comply with worker safety 
laws, which will lead to use of safety meetings 
even if this practice does not decrease the fi rm 
accident rate. Firms with high accident rates 
may also use the safety meeting safety practice 
as a remedial tool to help increase their safety 
performance.
Interestingly, fi rm characteristics appear 
to be some of the most significant factors 
influencing fi rm accident rates. Three of the 
most signifi cant negative variables in the model 
are firm characteristics: safety performance 
marketing strategy, use of owner-operators, and 
unionization. Though unionization is declining 
in the industry, it appears to overwhelmingly 
reduce carrier accident rates. Use of owner-
operators is another fi rm characteristic that is 
signifi cantly related to lower carrier accident 
rates. This result is consistent with the principal-
agent theory, which suggests that drivers that 
own their tractor or truck have more incentive 
to engage in safe driving behavior and safety 
inducing vehicle maintenance practices. Also 
consistent with expectations and previous 
empirical evidence is the negative coeffi cient 
on fi rm size. There were no clear expectations as 
to the signs of the coeffi cients of OTP and LTL. 
Both of these variables have positive coeffi cients 
in the regression results, though neither variable 
is signifi cant.
The signifi cance of the regressions is tested 
using an F-statistic. Despite low R-squared 
values, the computed F-statistics are 8.08 for 
the injury accident rate (IA) regression, and 8.14 
for the fatality and injury accident rate (FAIA) 
regression. The computed F-statistics confi rm 
the signifi cance of both regressions.
The percentage change interpretation of 
dummy variables is based on Kennedy’s unbiased 
approximate estimator along with standard error 
and variance from the Garderen and Shah (2002) 
unbiased approximate estimator of the variance. 
These results are reported in Tables 4 and 5.
Some of the percentage effects seem quite 
dramatic. In particular, COLLAV (controlling 
for other variables in the model) reduces carrier 
injury accident rate by more than 50%. While this 
result seems quite remarkable, the accompanying 
approximation for unbiased variance and stan-
dard error is quite large. This illustrates the value 
of the newly proposed approximate unbiased 
estimator for the variance. Caution should be 
used when interpreting the percentage effects of 
dummy variables when the estimated variance is 
large. This is true even when the OLS estimated 
coeffi cient is statistically signifi cant (Garderen & 
Shah, 2002). Variables with notable percentage 
changes with relatively low approximated vari-
ance are UNION and FLEETSPEED. Both of 
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Table 2: Injury Accident Rate Regression Results
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Table 3: Injury and Fatality Accident Rate Regression Results
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these variables have OLS coeffi cients signifi cant 
at the 0.01 level and both roughly reduce the fi rm 
accident rate by 30%.
Often, when using firm-level data, 
heteroscedasticity may become a problem due 
to variation caused by fi rm size. Goldfeld-Quant 
and Breusch-Pagan tests for heteroscedasticity 
were performed on both models to test for 
this possibility. The Goldfeld-Quant test was 
performed with respect to the data sorted by 
fi rm size (total assets). The resulting Goldfeld-
Quant statistics from testing the disturbances of 
a regression of the lower quartile and compared 
to the disturbances from a regression on the 
upper quartile of data is F[116,116]=0.793 for 
the IA model and F[116,116]=0.792 for the 
FAIA model. The critical value is 1.357, so the 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity is not rejected. 
Multiple Breusch-Pagan tests were performed; 
the first one on the entire set of regressors, 
then a second test with only the continuous 
regressors (SIZE and OOP), and a third test 
on SIZE only. All three of these tests, for both 
regressions, also fail to reject the hypothesis 
of homoscedasticity. Based on these tests it 
is concluded that heteroscedasticity is not a 
problem for inferences based on the results of 
this model (Greene, 2000, pp. 507-510).
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Table 4: Injury Accident Rate Regression Percentage Effect Results
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CONCLUSION
Motor carrier managers have a range of safety 
practices and technologies to choose among to 
reduce their carrier accident rate. This paper fi nds 
that fleet speed limits, safety performance market-
ing strategies, apprenticeship training programs, 
and collision avoidance systems are negatively 
related to carrier accident rates. The fi rm char-
acteristics of unionization, safety performance 
marketing strategy, and use of owner-operators 
also signifi cantly reduce carrier accident rates. 
The results fi nd that the safety practice of fi rm 
safety meetings is the only variable signifi cantly 
related to higher fi rm accident rates.
New technologies in the motor carrier indus-
try promise exciting safety gains in the future. 
Technology improvements in vehicle construc-
tion, particularly vehicle dynamics and braking 
systems and in-vehicle technologies like colli-
sion avoidance systems, adaptive cruise control 
and camera monitoring of vehicle blind spots, are 
technologies that are likely to reduce the occur-
rence of large truck crashes. Additionally, tech-
nology will help to reduce the severity of large 
truck crashes. Crash-severity-reducing technolo-
gies include driver crash-protection systems and 
rear cushioning bumpers. The relatively low 
adoption rates of such technologies limited the 
empirical analysis of technologies in this study. 
As adoption rates increase, it will be important to 
evaluate the safety effects of new technologies, 
particularly with respect to the use of technology 
in government inspection programs.
The results show that firms with the 
safety performance marketing strategy have 
signifi cantly lower accident rates. This supports 
the contention that fi rm management policies can 
directly impact the safety performance of the 
fi rm. In future studies it would be interesting to 
examine the cost structure of fi rms with a safety 
performance marketing strategy, particularly 
whether fi rms are able to recoup additional safety 
expenditures through rate differentials, reduced 
insurance costs, and/or reduced accident costs.   
This study fi nds strong evidence that use of 
owner-operators reduces carrier accident rates. 
The principal-agent theory, contractual relation-
ships, ownership structure, and fi rm size are areas 
for future motor carrier safety research. Though 
drivers resist monitoring technologies, it is likely 
that manager incentives to use such technologies 
will make on-board computers commonplace in 
the industry. This will likely have a signifi cant 
impact on use of owner-operators.
It is clear that unions have successfully 
served their role in providing for worker safety. 
Evidence has demonstrated that unionized 
firms have different cost structures than 
non-unionized fi rms, resulting in higher fi rm 
operating costs (Kerkvliet & McMullen, 1997). 
Union participation has declined dramatically 
since deregulation and as firms struggle to 
reduce operating costs the trend of decreasing 
unionization is likely to continue. Though union 
work rules may restrict operating flexibility, 
managers should evaluate and then incorporate 
union rules which increase safety without hurting 
the competitiveness of the fi rm.
The results show a signifi cant relationship 
between fleet speed limits and lower carrier 
accident rates. Fleet speed limits may reflect 
a greater ‘safety culture’ of the fi rm, but more 
importantly, this result reinforces the common 
knowledge that speed is a factor in most serious 
motor vehicle accidents. Within a ruthlessly 
competitive industry that strives for on-time 
performance and short turn-around schedules 
to meet the shipper needs for fast service and 
just-in-time inventories, it is important to 
emphasize the need to drive at reasonable speeds. 
The signifi cance of fi rm fleet speed limits also 
highlights the necessity of adequate highway 
speed limit enforcement and hours-of-service 
regulations.
If firm safety meetings are in fact an 
Occupational Health and Safety Administration 
work rule, then the positive relationship between 
safety meetings and carrier accident rates 
indicates the need to evaluate the effectiveness 
of such mandatory government regulations. This 
unpredicted result may also indicate a failure in 
the data to distinguish between varying levels 
of activities within the safety practice. For all of 
the attention motor carrier safety receives—as 
an industry priority, from the public, and from 
government safety regulators, there has been 
relatively little recent literature on the subject. 
Motor carrier accident rate data is plentiful 
and independent economic policy evaluation 
is desperately lacking (Hauer, 1989; Moses & 
Savage, 1997).
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